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Abstract: Does speculation facilitate price discovery or instability? If it is price discovery, it is
beneficial and should be encouraged; if it is instability, welfare is enhanced by its reduction.
This paper seeks to distinguish between these two characteristics by analysing those times when
speculation in the foreign exchange market is most extreme. A series of event studies are conducted
on the extremes of speculative sentiment and speculative activity. If speculation is noise, extreme
sentiment and extreme positions should lead to overshooting and increase risk of subsequent reversals.
The finding that speculative extremes do not provide information about subsequent returns implies
that speculation is part of the process of price discovery and that efforts to reduce it would reduce
the informational efficiency of financial markets.
Keywords: foreign exchange; speculation; event-study
1. Introduction
Speculation can be viewed as stabilising or destabilising. If speculation is informed, it is a
stabilising force, providing liquidity and helping to ensure that markets swiftly find equilibrium.
Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1946) emphasise the role that speculation plays in facilitating financial
market transactions by providing liquidity that allows hedgers and other market participants to swiftly
find counterparties without the need for large price concessions. In this version, speculators offer a
service for a fee that is determined by the return on their activity. Friedman (1953) argued that even
when speculation is a mixture of informed and uninformed, the informed would tend to buy when
prices were below intrinsic value and sell when above, making profits, limiting volatility and driving
the loss-making uninformed speculators out of business. However, Keynes (1936, p. 101) also had a
later, more negative view of speculation. Here he regarded it as a myopic, sentient-driven activity,
dominated by the desire to “beat the gun” or “outwit the crowd”. Uninformed speculators may now
dominate and De Long et al. (1990) provide a model where speculative noise constrains informed
traders from benefiting from their knowledge. Now speculation is an uninformed and destabilising
force. We have therefore two concepts of speculation: one that is random and disruptive and one that
is informed and beneficial.
The debate about the relative merit of these two concepts of speculation continues. This has been
particularly evident in commodities and foreign exchange markets. Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990)
find suspicious co-movement of commodities’ prices that they attribute to speculation. There has
been much discussion of the role that speculation played in the boom and bust of commodity prices
in the period between 2003 and 2007. This is usually called The Masters’ Thesis after Fund Manager
Michael Masters testimony to the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government
Affairs in May 2008 that linked commodity index investors, rising food and energy prices and the
so-called financialisation of commodity markets. Tang and Xiong (2012) suggest that price disruption
was exacerbated by newly established commodity indices that increased the amount of speculation
in the commodity markets. However, Irwin et al. (2015) dispute this thesis, citing the working of the
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futures market and the relationship between speculative activity and prices. Jacks (2015) document
the long history of speculation being blamed for price volatilities.
Across a range of other financial markets there have been investigations of the link between
speculation or noise trading and price misalignments or volatility. Verma and Verma (2007) examine
noise trading in equity markets; Yan (2009) argues that speculation is not random and influential in
aggregation but that behavioural biases will cause systematic deviations from intrinsic value. Foreign
exchange has been a particular focus as a consequence of its liquidity, volatility and the way that
speculative attacks appear to have infringed on government sovereignty. See Dornbusch (1988) in
general and Eichengreen and Wypolsz (1993) for discussion of the speculative attacks on the European
exchange rate system. Eichengreen et al. (1994) use a set of economic data to show that speculative
attacks drove European Exchange Rate Mechanism devaluations rather than fundamentals. However,
others have made the case that speculation is a key part of the foreign exchange market, providing
liquidity and contributing to stability. See Mayer (1985) and Ronals (Ronals).
There is no consensus and the debate enters policy circles with the suggestion that a tax
on financial transactions could reduce speculation and thereby limit misalignment and volatility.
Tobin (1978, p. 158) and Tobin (1988) say that such a tax would “throw some sand in the well-greased
wheels” of the foreign exchange market. At face value the tax has the advantage of improving market
efficiency and raising funds for other welfare-enhancing activity. However, this is only the case if
speculation is uninformed and destabilising. If it is informed and contributes to stability, the tax will
come at a cost.
The motivation is to contribute to this debate and to specifically make the case that a tax on
transactions in the foreign exchange market would not be costless. This paper evaluates the relative
importance of these two concepts of speculation by investigating the relationship between the intensity
of speculation and the weight of speculative positions relative to subsequent movement of foreign
exchange prices. The foreign exchange market is appropriate in this study because it is central to the
call for the introduction of a transaction tax as a consequence of it being the largest and most liquid
financial market in the world. The latest survey taken by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in
April 2016 estimated average daily turnover at $5.1 trn with average daily spot transactions of $1.7 trn.
See BIS (2016). The cost of trading in this market, when measured in terms of the size of the bid-ask
spread, is extremely low. An analysis by Chelley-Steeley and Tsorakidis (2013) of the bid-ask spreads
for USD-JPY, GBP-USD and EUR-USD for the period of January 2001 to 2005 finds that the average
spread for each is 0.342%, 0.305% and 0.326% respectively. This would be the cost for a round-trip
(buying and selling immediately), which makes it relatively attractive for speculators.
The intensity of speculation is measured in two ways: speculative sentiment and speculative
positions. Speculative sentiment is identified with the use of option risk-reversal skew. As these
become more extreme they signal that expectations of future value in the foreign exchange options
market have diverged significantly from the appropriate forward rate. The weight of speculative
positions is identified with US regulatory data of the positions held by type of participant in the futures
market. Net long and net short are open positions held by speculators relative to total speculator
activity or to the total overall activity in the market. See Section 3 for full data details.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the framework of informed and
uninformed speculation; Section 3 talks about the measurement of speculation and the event study
method; Section 4 reviews the evidence; Section 5 concludes.
2. Informed and Uninformed Speculation
Speculation plays an important part in several areas of financial economics. However, there
is no clear, unambiguous theory of speculation. Speculation is frequently associated with the term
trading and the provision of liquidity, but trading is broader as it encompasses financial investment
while liquidity provision is really market-making. Speculation and trading can be categorised as
being informed or uninformed. Those trading without information are frequently called noise-traders
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or liquidity traders. The first implies some random quality that flows from the lack of information.
However, psychologists find that the cognitive short-cuts or heuristics that are used to make decisions
under uncertainty tend to have biases Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and numerous studies purport to
find these biases in financial asset prices. For example, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) find evidence that
representativeness causes stock prices to overshoot and Coval and Shumway (2005) identifies evidence
of behavioural biases among Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders. Liquidity trades are generally
those carrying out transactions for reasons other than value. This can be passive investment funds
buying stocks as money that is drawn from investors or hedging activity that does not depend on
price. The terms are not fixed and Dow and Gorton (2008, p. 1) categorise noise-traders as all those
trading in markets for “non-information-based reasons”. See Ramiah et al. (2015) for a recent review of
the noise-trader literature.
Black (1986, p. 529) asserted that the interaction of informed and uninformed activity was essential
to the smooth functioning of financial markets. Noise, he argued, was the “the arbitrary element in
expectations”. Therefore, noise makes financial markets possible but imperfect: the more noise-traders
that there are, the more liquidity and the easier it is to trade; the more noise-traders, the higher the
level of inefficiency in the market and the more likely that price will be driven from fundamental value.
Uninformed activity provides a rationale and the opportunity for trading. Unless there is a
difference of opinion about value, there is no reason to exchange. Uninformed speculation can create
space between price and fundamental value that can be exploited by informed speculators. This space can
encourage informed traders to pay the cost of acquiring information in the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
model. There is equilibrium between the cost of obtaining information and the benefits that are expected
to come from the use of the information.
The foreign exchange market is primarily a dealer-orientated market. It is largely consistent
with the theoretical microstructure models that have been presented by the likes of Kyle (1985)
and Glosten (1985). The interaction of informed and uninformed traders drives the price-discovery
process: if the uninformed traders are random, the market-maker earns the bid-ask spread; if informed
traders arrive to realise their informational advantage, they cause an inventory imbalance for the
market-maker and drive the price towards equilibrium. Therefore, there is a link between information,
orders and price.
Lyons (1995), Evans and Lyons (2002) and Rime et al. (2015) show that order flow can explain
exchange rate movements much more effectively than fundamentals. The initiating or forcing orders
drive the price. Therefore, deliberate speculative activity should drive the price. Speculative sentiment
changes and speculative position changes would be part of the price discovery process if informed
and would disrupt this process if not. Therefore, if speculators are informed, their activity drives
exchange rates towards equilibrium and prices should follow a random walk after these extremes of
speculative sentiment or position; if speculators are uninformed and their activity can be regarded as
noise, the most extreme speculative sentiment and the time when speculators have the greatest weight
in the market should correspond with the greatest deviation of prices from fundamental value, when
subsequent price reversals are most likely to take place.
3. Measuring Speculation
There are two steps: identify speculation and assess what happens when it becomes extreme.
If speculation is uninformed, extremes should cause a divergence from fundamental value and a price
reversal should be anticipated; if informed and part of the price-discovery process, extreme speculation
achieves a new equilibrium and the following price performance should be a random walk.
The measurement of speculative sentiment should identify how far speculators believe that the
market will move in a particular direction. This study is about short-term movements in foreign exchange
prices. The event windows are between one week and four weeks in length. While the interpretation of
economic fundamentals can drive prices, market positions and liquidity trades will also be important.
Even at longer horizons it is often very difficult to connect exchange rate movements to specific
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events. Meese and Rogoff (1983) find that forecasts using exchange rate models cannot beat a random
walk while Cheung et al. (2005) updated the study to find very similar and more recent results.
In the absence of a daily survey of speculators, this study uses a unique series of option risk-reversal
skew as a measure of speculative sentiment. The risk-reversal data is very difficult to obtain in an
over-the-counter market like foreign exchange where there is no centralised exchange to record and
collect information, generally being the property of quoting institutions. The risk-reversals are the
average prices quoted at 10:00 GMT by major banks on the Thomson-Reuters composite option pages
(OPT1) for the period between 2 January 1996 and 6 September 2002. The risk-reversals are the spread
of implied volatility for a one month 25 delta at-the-money call option relative to the equivalent put.
Risk-reversal skew is the relative price of currency put and call options for the same strike price.
The risk-reversal skew is the relationship between a call option and the equivalent put. Equivalence
here being measured by the delta or relationship between movement of the underlying price and
the movement of the option price. While the Black and Scholes (1973) model is the basis for valuing
options where the price of a non-dividend paying stock trades at a discount to the forward rate equal
to the risk free rate, the forward rate in a currency option is determined by the relative interest rate
differential between the two currencies. The Garman and Kohlhagan (1983) adjustment that accounts
for the difference in interest payments on the two currencies is used. The spot discount is determined
therefore by the relative interest rate differential for the appropriate maturity, which is one month
in this case. This model allows the market practice of pricing options from the volatility implied by
the model. In other words, the Garman-Kohlhagan is used to extract the volatility that is implied by
a specific foreign exchange option price given the strike and other parameters. It is usual to quote
foreign exchange options in the form of implied volatility.
There is a widespread use of option prices to uncover market expectations. See Malick and Thomas (1997)
and Shiue (2001) for the general approach that combines the implied volatility, risk-reversal and
strangles to infer a mixed distribution that can be inferred as the risk-neutral probability density
function for a particular asset. See Gaati and Malick (2005) an application on the Yen-dollar exchange
rate where expectations are affected by central bank intervention. Using the risk-reversal is a simplified
version of that where the skew is used to infer positive and expectations relative to the appropriate
forward rate. See Eitrheim (1999) and ECB (2003) for previous use implied volatility data for this type
of exercise.
If the risk-reversal for a 1-month USD/CAD is quoted at 0.15–0.28% and the implied volatility is
8.50%, the market-maker would be willing to buy the 1-month 25 delta USD-put-CAD-call at 8.65%
and sell the USD-call-CAD-put at 8.50%. The dealer pays 0.15%. Alternatively, the dealer would sell a
25 delta call at 8.78% and buy the USD-call-CAD-put at 8.50%, earning 0.28%. See Kapner (2006) for a
technical review. Therefore, the relationship between implied volatility for calls and implied volatilities
for puts for the same delta and maturity strike is an indication of how much more expensive calls
are relative to the equivalent put or as the market bias towards puts over calls and as an indication
of market sentiment or related market positioning. The larger the absolute level of the risk-reversal
skew, the greater the relative price and, if the deviation is based on information, subsequent price
action should be zero on average; if the deviation is based on noise, this movement should be reversed.
See Yan (2011) and Feng et al. (2015) for some analysis of implied volatility in the equity market.
Recording speculative activity in an over-the-counter market like foreign exchange is extremely
difficult. However, there are some exchange-traded currency derivative markets in the US, and
participants in these markets are required to report their positions to the US regulators. The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) collects weekly information about the open positions held by
private entities in the US derivative markets. A sub-set of this information is released to the public
each week as the Commitment of Traders Report (CoT). The CFTC (2012) require traders to categorise
themselves as being either commercial (C) or non-commercial (NC). Commercial traders must have
some underlying business interest in the security, commodity or instrument that they are trading. These
could be seen as natural hedgers. Non-commercial accounts are generally considered to be speculators.
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The data used run from 30 September 1998 when the data started to be released on a weekly basis and
continue up to 31 December 2008. The Euro data runs from 3 March 1998 to 31 December 2008. There
are two gaps in the Swiss Franc data for 14 September 2004 and 21 September 2004. The absence of
these data seems to be a result of problems with the CFTC database. The contracts are for EUR 100,000;
GBP 62,500; JPY 12,500,000; CHF 100,000 and CAD 100,000. Two new series are created from the raw
data. These are labelled S1 and S2. S1 measures net non-commercial positions relative to the total
non-commercial positions and S2 measures non-commercial positions relative to open interest. See
Sanders et al. (2004) and Wang (2004) for examples of previous use of this data to identify speculation.
S1 =
NCL− NCS
NCL + NCS + NCSP
(1)
where NCL are the non-commercial long positions (holding non-US currency); NCS and non-commercial
short positions and NCSP and the non-commercial spreading positions (spread long and short between
different contract maturities). This will measure within the speculative group how biased they are
towards holding long or short positions.
S2 =
NCL− NCS
OI
(2)
where NCL are the non-commercial long positions (holding non-US currency); OI is the open interest
in the contract. This will measure how biased speculators are to holding long or short positions relative
to the whole market. As such, S2 is the preferred measure as it picks up not only direction but also the
prominence of speculators relative to other agents.
The Event Study
It is common to use series that measure market sentiment or market postitions or even proxies like
moving averages as trading-rules that aim to achieve abnormal returns. See for example, Olson (2004),
Papailias and Thomakos (2015), Maltz (1996) and De Bock and de Carvalho Filho (2015). It is assumed
that the signals will identify times when the market is inefficient. However, in our case there is a
direct test of the informational content of extreme speculative sentiment and speculative positions.
A special case of the event study method will be used to identify what happens to foreign exchange
prices around the time that speculative sentiment or speculative positions are extreme. If speculation is
uninformed when speculative sentiment or speculative positions are extremely biased to one direction,
there should be the greatest divergence from fundamental value and therefore the greatest risk of
reversal; if speculation is informed these extremes are part of the adjustment to a new equilibrium.
An event study will analyse the performance of security of asset prices around an event. In this case,
the event is the extreme of speculative sentiment or extreme speculative activity.
Dolly (1933) is credited with the original event study method while Fama et al. (1969) developed
the method to investigate the reaction of equity prices to news of a stock split. An event study will
look at the evolution of asset prices in a window around an event. One of the major challenges in this
process is to disentangle the effect of the event from all the other information that is around at that
time. This problem is usually addressed in two ways: modelling the expected value of the asset and
viewing deviations from the expected value as being influenced by the event; using a large sample
that, on the condition that there are no confounding factors at that time, would tend to dilute the effect
of other information.
The event is an extreme reading of risk-reversal or speculative positions. The extreme is defined
as being either the top or bottom 5th or 1st percentile of all the series. The expected value should
be the forward rate but given that we are looking at very short time horizons and interest rates for
these currencies are relatively low, it is reasonable to take the expected value as zero and to investigate
positive or negative exchange rate return. It is standard practice to call this the abnormal return to
signify that it is different from the expected value. Returns are cumulated through the event window
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and the average recorded to give the cumulative abnormal return for the whole window (CARW) and
cumulative abnormal return for after the event (CARA). The number of samples depend on the how
the extreme sentiment and positions are defined. As is seen in Table 1 taking the 5th and 95th percentile
as the extreme for the risk-reversal skew will give around 100 samples for each exchange rate; Table 2
shows that the 95th percentile gives just less than 50 samples for the extreme positions. The results do
not seem to be sensitive to the definition of extreme. The event windows are between one and four
days for the risk-reversal and between two and four weeks for the speculative positions. The results
do not depend on the event window.
4. Analysis of Results
Table 1 records the result of the event studies that were carried out on extreme risk reversal.
For each exchange rate, the second column distinguishes between extreme high and extreme low
risk-reversals, the third column identifies the number of extreme events that were recorded while the
following two columns show the cumulative average returns for the whole event window (CARW)
and the cumulative average returns for the event and the period after (CARA). The windows were
chosen to correspond to one day and one week of trading.
Table 1. Event Study: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Extreme Risk Reversal.
5th and 95th Percentile 1st and 99th Percentile
1 Day 4 Day 1 Day 4 Day
N CARW CARA N CARW CARA N CARW CARA N CARW CARA
EUR Hi 87 0.4103 * 0.1586 87 0.9442 * 0.1505 22 0.0309 −0.1748 22 0.5781 * −0.5387 *Lo 106 −0.3313 * −0.0933 106 −0.0816 * −0.1991 21 0.3040 0.1820 21 0.7935 * 0.4377
JPY Hi 90 0.4860 * 0.1341 90 1.5158 * 0.2531 20 0.8227 * 0.3078 * 20 2.4337 * 0.8284 *Lo 90 −0.3168 0.0945 90 −1.3532 * 0.1984 17 −1.6990 * −0.9347 * 17 −3.6751 * −1.2556 *
GBP Hi 96 0.3303 * 0.1903 * 96 0.8966 * 0.2547 21 0.5252 * 0.1774 21 1.3131 * 0.3284Lo 97 −0.1894 0.0312 97 -0.8031 * 0.1500 24 −0.2630 −0.0866 24 −0.6660 0.1888
CHF Hi 80 0.0065 −0.0565 80 0.5624 * 0.1322 18 −0.0022 −0.1518 18 0.4887 −0.1768Lo 75 −0.3716 * −0.1125 75 −1.0071 * −0.0219 18 0.0064 0.1704 18 −0.8661 * 0.7631
CAD Hi 113 −0.0038 −0.0489 113 0.1872 −0.1951 24 −0.1081 −0.0462 24 0.3935 * −0.1592Lo 97 −0.1422 * −0.0571 97 −0.2896 * 0.0035 26 −0.2008 −0.0146 26 0.1185 0.4560 *
AUD Hi 101 0.2539 * 0.0125 101 0.8728 * 0.0875 33 0.5099 * 0.0682 33 1.1501 * 0.1046Lo 138 −0.4384 * −0.1711 138 −1.14935 * −0.2714 * 20 −0.4334 0.0563 20 −1.7360 * 0.1914
EURJPY Hi 95 −0.0504 −0.1103 95 −0.0128 −0.2579 23 −0.2932 −0.4188 * 23 −0.8203 −1.0195Lo 97 −0.4746 * −0.1647 97 −1.6757 * −0.4595 20 −1.3630 * −0.6976 * 20 −3.6849 * −1.1999 *
EURGBP Hi 91 0.1544 0.0696 91 0.5176 * 0.0979 28 0.2048 0.1195 28 0.4146 −0.0645Lo 122 0.0451 0.0996 122 −0.3097 * 0.2903 * 21 −0.07523 −0.0780 21 −0.4120 0.1290
EURCHF Hi 77 0.1183 * 0.0690 77 0.3444 * 0.0749 31 0.1482 * 0.0739 31 0.4993 * 0.1816 *Lo 94 −0.0344 0.0194 94 −0.1596 0.1952 * 24 −0.3626 * −0.1483 24 −0.7573 * 0.0875
Where Hi means extreme high in the risk-reversal skew and Lo means extreme low in the risk reversal skew;
extreme is calculated as being equal or above the 95th or 99th percentile or equal or below the 5th or 1st percentile
respectively; CARW is the cumulative abnormal return for the whole window, before and after the extreme event,
and CARA is the cumulative abnormal return for the period after the event, which is the event day and the window;
abnormal return is anything that is different from zero; the asterisk denotes significantly different from zero, where
statistical significance is more than 95% of 1000 means calculated from random bootstrap samples from the events
are above or below zero respectively.
As speculators become more extreme in their opinion, exchange rates are driven in the direction
of sentiment. Looking down the seventh column (the 4-day CARW) reveals the average cumulative
return for the period from four days before the extreme speculative sentiment to the four days after
the event. The extreme highs are those points when the risk-reversal skew is at or above the 95th
percentile. For the whole event window (CARW), extreme highs (labelled “Hi”) are associated with
positive returns and the extreme lows (labelled “Lo”) are associated with negative returns. In most
instances these are significantly different from zero.
That sentiment drives price appears evident from the covariance of speculative sentiment with
exchange rate prices. This finding is consistent with the evidence of previous research that has used
order-flow or sentiment from the likes of Evans and Lyons (2002), Sanders et al. (2004) and Wang (2004).
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If speculation is not informed, the extreme is caused by herding or institutional features; if speculation
is informed, it is facilitating the absorption of this information into the price.
Does knowledge about the extreme at event time t = 0 provide information about the future
returns? If this speculation is noise, informed traders, such as real money or long-term fundamental
accounts, should take advantage of the space that has been created between the price and the
fundamental value and a reversal should be seen. Whether this is the case is recorded in columns 5,
8, 11 and 14 of Table 1. A reversal is indicated by a significant negative reading for highs or positive
reading for lows. Looking, for example, at the four-day window in column 8, it is clear that the extreme
risk reversal skew does not provide any information about future returns. Of the 18 cases using the
5th and 95th percentiles to identify extremely negative and extremely positive sentiment respectively,
10 show a continuation (rather than a reversal) that is not significantly different from zero; one shows
a significant continuation; five show reversals that are not significant; only two show significant
reversal—EURCHF in each case. For the more extreme event when the 99th percentile is used, there
is even less clarity. Just over half the cases with the four-day window show a reversal (8 of 18), but
only two of these are statistically significant. The level of statistical significance does not make any
difference. Exchange rate prices are as likely to go up as down after an extreme and there does not
appear to be any information about the future from knowledge of these extremes. Extremes seem to be
followed by a random walk as would be the case if the extreme were the result of information being
absorbed into the price. Figures 1 and 2 show details of a selection of the event studies. Figure 1 is the
extreme high (99th percentile) with a 16 day window. There is no evidence of a reversal in any of the
currency units. Figure 2 is the extreme low (10th percentile) with a 16 day event window. Only the
CAD shows any evidence of reversal.
Table 2 shows the results from the event studies that were carried out using speculative positions
as reported to US regulators. The table works in a similar way to Table 1. The first column is the
exchange rate, defined as units per US dollar. The table is then split into two parts. The first part
uses the S1 measure, the net non-commercial (speculative) positions relative to total non-commercial
(speculative) positions; the second is S2 as the net non-commercial position relative to open interest
or the total outstanding open positions. Therefore, the first captures the balance of speculative
positions while the second captures the balance of speculative positions relative to the whole market.
If speculators become more prevalent or dominant in the market, this will show up in S2 but not in S1.
S1 is more sensitive to changes in sentiment and more volatile. Each of these sections is broken into the
results for a two week window and a four week window. There is a row for extreme high and extreme
low which represents extreme long positions or extreme short positions; the first column identifies the
number of cases; CARW is the cumulative abnormal return for the whole event window; CARA is the
cumulative abnormal return for the period after the event to the end of the window.
Once again, there is a very strong association between returns and the activity of speculators.
For the 4-day window and the S1 and S2 measures, every one of the currencies studied, high and low,
had a mean cumulative return for the whole of the event window that was in the same direction as
sentiment. When re-sampled 1000 times, more than 95 percent of the means calculated were greater
than zero in all cases but one (GBP). There is evidence here of momentum and of prices following the
movement of speculator positions. Once again, it appears that orders from speculators drive the price.
There is little evidence that these self-reported speculators are driving prices away from
fundamentals with their activity. Sixty percent of the S1 cases still show a significant abnormal
return in the direction of the extreme four weeks after the extreme has been reached; only 30 percent
of the cases show a reversal and in only one of those do 95 percent of the means calculated after
re-sampling remain above zero. For S2 there is even less clarity, with 95 percent of the cases showing
a continuation and 40 percent of them showing significant continuation. The evidence here with
speculative positions is the same as that of speculative sentiment. Prices move in the direction of
speculative activity but speculative extremes do not provide information about the future. The price
action of the event study is consistent with speculation being informed rather than uninformed.
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Figures 3 and 4 show a selection of event studies that were carried out. Figure 3 is the extreme low
(10th percentile) with a 13 week window. There is no evidence of a reversal in any of the currency units.
Figure 4 is the extreme high (90th percentile) with a 13 week event window. Only the GBP shows any
evidence of reversal. It is not statistically significant.
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Figure 1. Event Study: Extreme (High 99th percentile) Risk Reversal Skew and 16 day event window:
Risk reversals are the ratio of implied volatility on calls to the equivalent put; extreme high is at or
above the 99th percentile for the whole range, cumulative returns are the sum of log exchange rate
returns. The event day is the day of the extreme risk reversal reading. If speculation is uninformed,
extremes should be followed by reversals; if speculation is informed, extremes are more likely to be
followed by a random walk. The solid line is the cumulative mean return from the start of the event
window; the dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals constructed from 1000 random bootstrap
samples of appropriate event window day.
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Figure 2. Event Study: Extreme (Low 10th percentile) Risk Reversal Skew and 16 day event window:
Risk reversals are the ratio of implied volatility on calls to the equivalent put; extreme low is at or
below the 10th percentile for the whole range, cumulative returns are the sum of log exchange rate
returns. The event day is the day of the extreme risk reversal reading. If speculation is uninformed,
extremes should be followed by reversals; if speculation is informed, extremes are more likely to be
followed by a random walk. The solid line is the cumulative mean return from the start of the event
window; the dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals constructed from 1000 random bootstrap
samples of appropriate event window day.
Table 2. Event Study: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Extreme Speculative Positions.
S1—Net Long per Speculators S2—Net Long per Open Positions
2 Week 4 Week 2 Week 4 Week
N CARW CARA N CARW CARA N CARW CARA N CARW CARA
EUR Hi 27 2.9415 * 1.3163 * 27 3.8059 * 1.7341 * 27 1.0974 * 0.2896 27 1.7667 * 0.0419Lo 27 −2.4258 * −1.2512 * 27 −3.9235 * −1.9254 * 27 −2.5122 * −1.0607 * 27 −4.4478 * −1.9285 *
JPY Hi 43 1.9749 * 0.7286 * 43 2.8628 * 0.7909 43 2.2463 * 1.0554 * 43 3.7125 * 1.4443 *Lo 43 −2.2014 * −1.1312 * 43 −3.2488 * −1.5758 * 43 −2.0605 * −0.9791 * 43 −2.6865 * −0.8318
GBP Hi 43 0.7102 −0.2116 43 1.0172 * −0.7902 * 43 1.2916 * 0.2370 43 1.6912 * 0.0126Lo 43 −0.6979 * 0.2902 43 −1.5330 * 0.1014 43 −1.8993 * −0.1415 43 −2.8830 * −0.0768
CHF Hi 43 1.4400 * −0.0988 43 2.8665 * −0.0993 43 2.5260 * 0.5074 43 3.6060 * 0.2158Lo 43 −2.1816 * −0.9770 * 43 −3.3030 * −0.09798 * 43 −1.2605 * −0.3070 43 −0.1.6021 * 0.0670
CAD Hi 43 1.8658 * 1.0195 * 43 3.5298 * 1.8319 * 43 2.0160 * 0.8788 * 43 3.0995 * 0.9921 *Lo 43 −1.3238 * −0.5548 * 43 −1.9151 * −0.7859 * 43 −1.2462 * −0.4505 * 43 −1.9390 * −0.6195 *
Where Hi means extreme high, either S1 which is the measure of net long non-commercial (speculative) positions
per total of speculators) or S2 which is the measure of net long non-commercial (speculative) positions per open
interest (total outstanding open positions); high and low are above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile
respectively; CARW is the cumulative abnormal return for the whole window, before and after the extreme event,
and CARA is the cumulative abnormal return for the period after the event, which is the event day and the window;
abnormal return is anything that is different from zero; the asterisk denotes significantly different from zero, where
statistical significance is that more than 95% of 1000 means calculated from random bootstraps from the extreme
readings are above or below zero.
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2018, 6, 22 10 of 13
−6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6
−
0.
08
−
0.
04
0.
00
Cumulative EUR returns
Event Weeks
R
et
ur
n
s
−6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6
−
0.
04
−
0.
02
0.
00
Cumulative JPY returns
Event Weeks
R
et
ur
n
s
−6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6
−
0.
07
−
0.
04
−
0.
01
Cumulative GBP returns
Event Weeks
R
et
ur
n
s
−6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6−
0.
03
0
−
0.
01
5
0.
00
0
Cumulative CAD returns
Event Weeks
R
et
ur
n
s
Figure 3. Event Study: Extreme (90th percentile), Non-commercial net long (S1), six week window.
Non-commercial net per OI (S2) are the net speculative positions (as reported to US regulator the
CFTC) relative to all open positions; extreme high is at or above the 90th percentile for the whole range,
cumulative returns are the sum of log exchange rate returns. The event day is the day of the extreme
reading as a measure of extreme speculative activity. If speculation is uninformed, extremes should be
followed by reversals; if speculation is informed, extremes are more likely to be followed by a random walk.
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Figure 4. Event Study: Extreme (90th percentile), Non-commercial net long (S1), 6 week window.
Non-commercial net per OI (S2) are the net speculative positions (as reported to US regulator the
CFTC) relative to all open positions; extreme high is at or above the 90th percentile for the whole range,
cumulative returns are the sum of log exchange rate returns. The event day is the day of the extreme
reading as a measure of extreme speculative activity. If speculation is uninformed, extremes should be
followed by reversals; if speculation is informed, extremes are more likely to be followed by a random walk.
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5. Speculation and Foreign Exchange Returns
If foreign exchange speculation is uninformed noise, extreme speculation, whether measured by
sentiment or weight of activity, will coincide with deviations from fundamental value; if speculation is
informed, speculation is part of the process of price discovery and extremes will provide no information
about future prices. It appears that speculation drives prices towards equilibrium and that speculation
is informed. An event study showed that exchange rates move in the direction of speculative sentiment
and activity. However, once extreme speculative sentiment or extreme speculative positions are
established, prices are as likely to continue as to reverse. The random moves after the extreme is
indicative of foreign exchange prices having absorbed available information: the next information and
movement is random.
The results do not depend on the design of the event study. The event window and the quantiles
that are chosen to measure the extreme can be changed. Alternative measures produced very similar
results. Alternative quantiles from 1% and 99% to 20% and 80% have been assessed; Figures 1–4 have
much wider windows and do not find any alternative to the view that extreme speculation is followed
by a random walk.
It is possible to raise some questions about the measures of speculation that are used here, though
the fact that two different measures show very similar results for daily and weekly data is encouraging.
For example, it may be disputed that there is a link between risk reversal and market sentiment.
However, the co-movement of this measure of sentiment with the exchange rate is consistent with the
findings of numerous studies that have used actual survey data to measure sentiment and expectations,
see for example Frankel and Froot (1987a) and Frankel and Froot (1987b). Nonetheless, future research
might try to consider the link between risk-reversals and other measures of expectations. It may also
be questioned whether speculative positions in the foreign exchange futures market can be used to
understand speculation in the much larger spot market. There are some private sources of information
about spot market speculation and future research might try to establish whether they show the
same results.
The foreign exchange market has a particular microstructure that is dominated by over-the-counter
transactions in the spot market. It is not clear whether these results could be used to make
assertions about other markets where there are alternative institutions. Future research might look at
risk-reversals in financial markets that are traded on electronic exchanges to see if these results can be
replicated. The data on speculative positions are from the exchange traded futures market.
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